The Analysis of Revenue Sharing in a New Approach to Collective Fiscal Decisions
I. The analytic framework, 418. — II. Revenue sharing in a Lindahl model, 420. — III. Revenue sharing and majority rule, 423. — IV. Revenue sharing in a more general framework, 426. — V. When revenue sharing differs from income redistribution, 430. — VI. A system with many clubs, 432. — VII. Concluding remarks, 434. — Appendix: A general theorem, 435.
Volume (Year): 85 (1971)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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