IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

A puha költségvetési korlát - II
[The soft budget constraint II]

  • Kornai, János

    ()

  • Maskin, Eric
  • Roland, Gérard

A tanulmány javaslatot tesz a puha költségvetési korlát fogalmának tisztázására. A fogalmat széles körben alkalmazzák mind a szocialista és posztszocialista, mind pedig a piaci gazdaságok elemzése során. A szerzők által megfogalmazott értelmezés fel öleli a puha költségvetési korlát jelenségcsoportjával kapcsolatos megközelítések zömét, és egyben osztályozza az okokat és a következményeket (I. rész). Ezen az értelmezésen alapul a témáról szóló elméleti irodalom áttekintése, valamint összeve tése a dinamikus elkötelezettség problematikájával foglalkozó más közgazdasági iro dalommal (II. rész). Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód:P10, P20, P30, P40, G20, G30, H60, H70.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.kszemle.hu/tartalom/letoltes.php?id=706
Download Restriction: Registration and subscription. 3-month embargo period to non-subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation) in its journal Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

Volume (Year): LI (2004)
Issue (Month): 9 ()
Pages: 777-809

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:706
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.kszemle.hu

Order Information: Postal: Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation) Budapest, Budaörsi út 45., 1112, Hungary
Web: http://www.kszemle.hu/elofizetes/ Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 1993. "On the credibility of 'big bang' programs: A note on wage claims and soft budget constraints in economies in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 387-395, April.
  2. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Djankov, Simeon, 2001. "Hardened Budgets and Enterprise Restructuring: Theory and an Application to Romania," CEPR Discussion Papers 2950, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Anderson, James H. & Korsun, Georges & Murrell, Peter, 2000. "Which Enterprises (Believe They) Have Soft Budgets? Evidence on the Effects of Ownership and Decentralization in Mongolia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 219-246, June.
  4. Berglöf, Erik & Roland, Gérard, 1995. "Bank Restructuring and Soft Budget Constraints in Financial Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1250, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  6. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1998. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget," Levine's Working Paper Archive 209, David K. Levine.
  7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
  8. Lubomir Lizal & Miroslav Singer & Jan Svejnar, 2001. "Enterprise Breakups And Performance During The Transition From Plan To Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(1), pages 92-99, February.
  9. Goldfeld, Stephen M. & Quandt, Richard E., 1993. "Uncertainty, bailouts, and the Kornai effect," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 113-119.
  10. Wendy Carlin & Steven Fries & Mark Schaffer & Paul Seabright, 2001. "Competition and Enterprise Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence from a Cross-country Survey," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 376, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  11. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
  12. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  13. Li, David D. & Liang, Minsong, 1998. "Causes of the Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence on Three Explanations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 104-116, March.
  14. Martin L. Weitzman, 1980. "The "Ratchet Principle" and Performance Incentives," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 302-308, Spring.
  15. Braga de Macedo, Jorge, 1990. "External Liberalization with Ambiguous Public Response: The Experience of Portugal," CEPR Discussion Papers 378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Berglof, Erik & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Soft Budget Constraints and Banking in Transition Economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 18-40, March.
  17. Janet Mitchell, 2000. "Theories of Soft Budget Constraints and the Analysis of Banking Crises," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(1), pages 59-100, March.
  18. Levaggi, Rosella & Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from the Italian National Health System," POLIS Working Papers 10, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  19. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
  20. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
  21. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "The credible-commitment problem in the center-enterprise relationship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 359-382, September.
  22. Raiser, Martin, 1994. "The no-exit economy: Soft budget constraints and the fate of economic reforms in developing countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(12), pages 1851-1867, December.
  23. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9593, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  24. Dewatripont, M & Maskin, E, 1995. "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 541-55, October.
  25. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 1998. "Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 132, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  26. Eric Maskin & Chenggang Xu, 2001. "Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 9(1), pages 1-27, March.
  27. Roland, G. & Szafarz, A., 1988. "The Ratchet Effect And The Planner'S Expectations," Papers 8802, Universite Libre de Bruxelles - C.E.M.E..
  28. Budina, Nina & Garretsen, Harry & de Jong, Elke, 2000. "Liquidity constraints and investment in transition economies - the case of Bulgaria," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2278, The World Bank.
  29. Roland, Gérard & Sekkat, Khalid, 1996. "Managerial Career Concerns, Privatization and Restructuring in Transition Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 1363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Djankov, Simeon, 1999. "The Enterprise Isolation Program in Romania," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 281-293, June.
  31. Sophie Brana & Mathilde Maurel & J�r�me Sgard, 1999. "Enterprise Adjustment and the Role of Bank Credit in Russia: Evidence from a 420 Firms Qualitative Survey," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 41(4), pages 47-69, December.
  32. Keren, Michael & Miller, Jeffrey & Thornton, James R., 1983. "The Ratchet: A dynamic managerial incentive model of the soviet enterprise," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 347-367, December.
  33. Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, 1993. "Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe," Munich Reprints in Economics 3109, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  34. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
  35. Wang, Yijiang, 1991. "Economic reform, fixed capital investment expansion, and inflation: A behavioral model based on the Chinese experience," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 3-27.
  36. Qian, Yingyi & Xu, Chenggang, 1998. "Innovation and Bureaucracy under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 151-64, January.
  37. Mark Duggan, 2000. "Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending," NBER Working Papers 7789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. Perotti, Enrico C., 1993. "Bank lending in transition economies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1021-1032, September.
  39. Stijn Claessens & R. Kyle Peters, 1997. "State enterprise performance and soft budget constraints: The case of Bulgaria," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 5(2), pages 305-322, November.
  40. Ilya R. Segal, 1998. "Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 596-609, Autumn.
  41. Mathias Dewatripont & Gérard Roland, 2000. "Soft budget constraints, transaction and financial systems," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9625, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  42. Grigorian, David A., 2000. "Ownership and performance of Lithuanian enterprises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2343, The World Bank.
  43. Simeon Djankov & Bernard Hoekman, 2000. "Market discipline and corporate efficiency: evidence from Bulgaria," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 190-212, February.
  44. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-75, September.
  45. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  46. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1994. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," NBER Working Papers 4886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  47. Huang, Haizhou & Xu, Chenggang, 1999. "Financial institutions and the financial crisis in East Asia," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 903-914, April.
  48. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
  49. Goldfeld, Stephen M. & Quandt, Richard E., 1990. "Output targets, the soft budget constraint and the firm under central planning," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 205-222, October.
  50. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
  51. Goldfeld, Stephen M. & Quandt, Richard E., 1988. "Budget constraints, bailouts, and the firm under central planning," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 502-520, December.
  52. John M. Litwack, 1993. "Coordination, Incentives, and the Ratchet Effect," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(2), pages 271-285, Summer.
  53. Xavier Freixas, 1999. "Optimal Bail Out Policy, Conditionality and Creative Ambiguity," FMG Discussion Papers dp327, Financial Markets Group.
  54. Clifford Zinnes & Yair Eilat & Jeffrey Sachs, 2001. "The Gains from Privatization in Transition Economies: Is "Change of Ownership" Enough?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 7.
  55. Cull, Robert & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2000. "Bureaucrats, State Banks, and the Efficiency of Credit Allocation: The Experience of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-31, March.
  56. Bertero, Elisabetta & Rondi, Laura, 2000. "Financial pressure and the behaviour of public enterprises under soft and hard budget constraints: evidence from Italian panel data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 73-98, January.
  57. Djankov, Simeon & Murrell, Peter, 2002. "Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3319, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  58. Monika Schnitzer, 1999. "Enterprise restructuring and bank competition in transition economies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(1), pages 133-155, March.
  59. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall.
  60. Nett, Lorenz, 1992. "Negative effects of competition in a medical-service market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 481-485, December.
  61. Frydman, R. & Gray, C. & Hessel, M. & Rapaczynski, A., 2000. "The Limits of Discipline: Ownership and Hard Budget Constraints in the Transition Economies," Working Papers 00-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  62. Maskin, Eric S., 1996. "Theories of the soft budget-constraint," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 125-133, June.
  63. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-62, December.
  64. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  65. Qian, Yingyi, 1994. "A Theory of Shortage in Socialist Economies Based on the "Soft Budget Constraint."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 145-56, March.
  66. Berglof, Erik & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1994. "Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1055-84, November.
  67. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996. "A Theory of Privatisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-19, March.
  68. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
  69. Moesen, Wim & van Cauwenberge, Philippe, 2000. " The Status of the Budget Constraint, Federalism and the Relative Size of Government: A Bureaucracy Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(3-4), pages 207-24, September.
  70. Brian Pinto & Vladimir Drebentsov & Alexander Morozov, 2000. "Give Macroeconomic Stability and Growth in Russia a Chance," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), pages 297-324, July.
  71. Magee, Karen L & Quandt, Richard E, 1994. " The Kornai Effect with Partial Bailouts and Taxes," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 27-38.
  72. Eric S. Maskin, 1999. "Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 421-425, May.
  73. Kornai, János, 2000. "A költségvetési korlát megkeményítése a posztszocialista országokban
    [Hardening of the budget constraint in the post-socialist countries]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 1-22.
  74. Corbett, Jenny, 1987. "International Perspectives on Financing: Evidence from Japan," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(4), pages 30-55, Winter.
  75. Majumdar, Sumit K., 1998. "Slack in the state-owned enterprise: An evaluation of the impact of soft-budget constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 377-394, May.
  76. Schnitzer, Monika, 1999. "Enterprise restructuring and bank competition in transition economies," Munich Reprints in Economics 19891, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  77. Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries, 1999. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 51-, March.
  78. Roman Frydman & Cheryl Gray & Marek Hessel & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 2000. "The Limits of Discipline: Ownership and Hard Budget Constraints in the Transition Economies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(3), pages 577-601, November.
  79. Freixas, Xavier & Guesnerie, Roger & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 173-91, April.
  80. von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1995. "Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 557-75, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:706. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Odon Sok)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.