The Kornai Effect with Partial Bailouts and Taxes
This model examines Kornai's observation that in the presence of bailouts, firms' demand for inputs will be greater than would otherwise be the case. This conjecture is examined in a model in which both revenue and cost uncertainty are present and in which firms making losses are partially subsidized and firms making positive profits are partially taxed. The Kornai effect is more prevalent the greater the subsidy rate, the smaller the tax rate and the greater the variance of the random variables through which uncertainty manifests itself. In the case of strongly positively correlated cost and revenue uncertainty, the absolute incidence of the Kornai effect is small. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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