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Enterprise Adjustment and the Role of Bank Credit in Russia: Evidence from a 420 Firm's Qualitative Survey

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  • Sophie Brana
  • Mathilde Maurel
  • Jérôme Sgard

Abstract

This paper is based on a 1996 industrial survey of 420 Russian firms' actual position, as opposed to their expectations and declared intentions. Factor analysis and ordered Probit techniques are used to test relationships between the various responses. The main conclusions are: 1) profit depends upon real productive performances, and, to a lesser extent, on financial discipline; 2) the demand for credit comes mainly from the worst-off firms or those already indebted; 3) the actual distribution of bank credit is allocated mostly to distressed firms, with poor performance and weak financial position.
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Suggested Citation

  • Sophie Brana & Mathilde Maurel & Jérôme Sgard, 1999. "Enterprise Adjustment and the Role of Bank Credit in Russia: Evidence from a 420 Firm's Qualitative Survey," Working Papers 1999-06, CEPII research center.
  • Handle: RePEc:cii:cepidt:1999-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Earle, J. & Estrin, Saul, 1996. "Privatisation versus competition: changing enterprise behavior in Russia," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20364, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Berglof, Erik & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Soft Budget Constraints and Banking in Transition Economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 18-40, March.
    3. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 1995. "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 541-555.
    4. Cohen, Daniel & de Boissieu, Christian & de Pontbriand, Gaël, 1995. "Russian Enterprises in Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1174, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Qian, Yingyi, 1994. "A Theory of Shortage in Socialist Economies Based on the "Soft Budget Constraint."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 145-156, March.
    6. G. Alfandari & M.E. Schaffer, 1996. ""Arrears" in the Russian Enterprise Sector," CERT Discussion Papers 9608, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
    7. Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766.
    8. Berglof, Erik & Roland, Gerard, 1997. "Soft budget constraints and credit crunches in financial transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 807-817, April.
    9. Lehmann, Hartmut & Wadsworth, Jonathan & Acquisti, Alessandro, 1999. "Grime and Punishment: Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian Federation," IZA Discussion Papers 65, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    10. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1996. "Whither Socialism?," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262691825, January.
    11. Earle, John S & Estrin, Saul, 1997. "After Voucher Privatization: The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Russian Manufacturing Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 1736, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexei Karas & Koen Schoors & Laurent Weill, 2010. "Are private banks more efficient than public banks?," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 18(1), pages 209-244, January.
    2. Sophie Brana & Mathilde Maurel, 1999. "Barter in Russia: Liquidity Shortage versus Lack of Restructuring," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 271, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    3. Mathilde Maurel, 2001. "Investment, Efficiency, and Credit Rationing: Evidence from Hungarian Panel Data," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 403, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    4. S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    5. Claeys, Sophie & Lanine, Gleb & Schoors, Koen, 2005. "Bank supervision Russian style : rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives," BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    6. J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland., 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
    7. Bignebat, C. & Gouret, F., 2006. "Which Firms Have a Soft Loan ? Managers' Believes in a Cross-Country Survey in Transition Economies," Working Papers MOISA 200603, UMR MOISA : Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs : CIHEAM-IAMM, CIRAD, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro - Montpellier, France.
    8. Kornai, János & Maskin, Eric & Roland, Gérard, 2004. "A puha költségvetési korlát - II
      [The soft budget constraint II]
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 777-809.
    9. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2007. "Enterprise Reform And Corporate Governance In Russia: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(5), pages 849-902, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    finance; Credit; adjustment; multiple choice analysis;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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