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The Timing of Elections in Federations: A Disciplining Device against Soft Budget Constraints?

Author

Listed:
  • Karolina Kaiser

    (Université de Munich)

  • Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

    (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics)

Abstract

We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse - with synchronized elections, i.e. simultaneous central and regional office terms, or with staggered elections, i.e. terms of office that do not coincide. We find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare

Suggested Citation

  • Karolina Kaiser & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2010. "The Timing of Elections in Federations: A Disciplining Device against Soft Budget Constraints?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10036
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9814-y
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    2. Diego Martínez‐López, 2022. "Subnational borrowing and bailouts: When the federal government looks at the votes (differently) and its borrowing matters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(3), pages 609-633, June.
    3. János Kornai, 2014. "The soft budget constraint," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 64(supplemen), pages 25-79, November.
    4. Kornai, János, 2014. "Bevezetés A puha költségvetési korlát című kötethez [Introduction to the author s volume entitled Soft Budget Constraint]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 845-897.
    5. Fiorillo, Fabio & Lucarelli, Stefano, 2024. "Political electoral cycles and evolution of Italian health care system financing. A long run perspective," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    6. Ross Hickey, 2015. "Intergovernmental transfers and re-election concerned politicians," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 331-351, November.
    7. Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2013. "Do bailouts buy votes? Evidence from a panel of Hessian municipalities," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 257-278, August.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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