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The Economics of Destructive Power

In: Handbook on the Economics of Conflict

Author

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  • Mehrdad Vahabi

Abstract

The Handbook on the Economics of Conflict conveys how economics can contribute to the understanding of conflict in its various dimensions embracing world wars, regional conflicts, terrorism and the role of peacekeeping in conflict prevention.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13624_5
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781848446496.00010.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 1988. "Contested Exchange: Political Economy and Modern Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 145-150, May.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
    4. Bush, Winston C. & Mayer, Lawrence S., 1974. "Some implications of anarchy for the distribution of property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 401-412, August.
    5. Manzini, Paola, 1999. "Strategic bargaining with destructive power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 315-322, December.
    6. Ekkehart Schlicht, 2008. "Consistency in Organization," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(4), pages 612-623, December.
    7. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
    8. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2006. "Between Social Order and Disorder: The Destructive Mode of Coordination," MPRA Paper 4, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-1231, December.
    10. Marilyn R. Flowers, 1987. "Rent Seeking and Rent Dissipation: A Critical View," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 7(2), pages 431-440, Fall.
    11. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    12. Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2006. "Insecure property rights and growth: the role of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 513-529, August.
    13. Holden Steinar, 1994. "Bargaining and Commitment in a Permanent Relationship," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 169-176, September.
    14. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    15. Hayes, Beth, 1984. "Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 57-83, January.
    16. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2010. "Integrating social conflict into economic theory," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 687-708.
    17. Benhabib, Jess & Rustichini, Aldo, 1996. "Social Conflict and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 125-142, March.
    18. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, October.
    19. Manzini, Paola, 1997. "Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 15-22, January.
    20. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-921, September.
    21. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1992. "Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 378-387, March.
    22. Anderton, Charles H & Anderton, Roxane A & Carter, John R, 1999. "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 166-179, January.
    23. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2005. "Destructive power, enforcement and institutional change," MPRA Paper 13236, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2006.
    24. Lane, Philip R & Tornell, Aaron, 1996. "Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 213-241, June.
    25. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2004. "The Political Economy of Destructive Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3481.
    26. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008. "The Paradox of Power," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
    27. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2006. "Ordres contradictoires et coordination destructive: le malaise iranien
      [Contradictory orders and detructive coordination: the Iranian disease]
      ," MPRA Paper 13235, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2008.
    28. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
    29. Lutz-Alexander Bush & Shouyong Shi & Quan Wen, 1998. "Bargaining with Surplus Destruction," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 915-932, November.
    30. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
    31. Say, Jean-Baptiste, 1880. "A Treatise on Political Economy; or the Production, Distribution, and Consumption of Wealth," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, edition 4, number say1880.
    32. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2009. "An Introduction to Destructive Coordination," Post-Print hal-00629124, HAL.
    33. White, Michael V., 2004. "Sympathy for the Devil: H. D. Macleod and W.S. Jevons's Theory of Political Economy," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(03), pages 311-329, September.
    34. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brauer, Jurgen & Caruso, Raul, 2011. "Peace economists and peace economics," MPRA Paper 34927, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Vahabi, Mehrdad & Hassani-Mahmooei, Behrooz, 2016. "The role of identity and authority from anarchy to order: Insights from modeling the trajectory of dueling in Europe," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 57-72.

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