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Consistency in Organization

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  • Schlicht, Ekkehart

    () (University of Munich)

Abstract

Recent thinking has emphasized the importance of consistency in a firm’s compensation policy. By starting from Williamson’s ideas about idiosyncratic exchange, this view can be supplied with some theoretical foundation. At the same time, the consistency view can be applied to a number of organizational issues. It sheds new light on some Williamsonian themes, like the boundaries of the firm or the attenuation of incentives within firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2003. "Consistency in Organization," IZA Discussion Papers 718, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp718
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
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    3. Clark, Gregory, 1984. "Authority and Efficiency: The Labor Market and the Managerial Revolution of the Late Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(04), pages 1069-1083, December.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Moore, John, 1992. "The firm as a collection of assets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 493-507, April.
    6. Coase, R H, 1978. "Economics and Biology: Evolution, Selection, and the Economic Principle: Discussion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 244-245, May.
    7. Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-571, September.
    8. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?," IEW - Working Papers 034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    9. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1998. "On Custom in the Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292241.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Aidan Walsh, 2011. "Learning from pondlife and fishermen: towards a modular financial services industry," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 312-322, November.
    3. Stefano Zamagni, 2013. "Cooperative entrepreneurship," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise, chapter 9, pages 94-107 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Zamagni, Stefano, 2005. "Per una teoria economico-civile dell'impresa cooperativa," AICCON Working Papers 10-2005, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    attenuation of incentives; Williamson's puzzle; theory of the firm; command; routines; centralization paradox;

    JEL classification:

    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence

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