IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Who Is in Charge? A Property Rights Perspective on Stakeholder Governance

  • Klein, Peter G.

    (University of MO)

  • Mahoney, Joseph T.

    (University of IL)

  • McGahan, Anita M.

    (University of Toronto and Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard University)

  • Pitelis, Christos N.

    (University of Cambridge)

Debates on "shareholder" and "stakeholder" approaches to corporate governance often get bogged down in competing normative claims about economic rent streams, entitlements of different group members, fairness, and similar distributional issues. These concerns are important, but core economic issues in shareholder-stakeholder debates revolve around the positive analysis of property rights, transaction costs, ownership, and control. Going beyond the stylized assumptions of neoclassical economics, which assume away co-investment by the firm's transactional and contractual partners, we show how theories of implicit and explicit contracting help us understand better joint investments and the creation of joint value. We call on scholars of Strategic Organization to embrace more robust theories of the firm and interfirm relations that take seriously the complex web of investments and residual claims that characterize team production and co-created value.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.business.illinois.edu/Working_Papers/papers/12-0102.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business in its series Working Papers with number 12-0102.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:illbus:12-0102
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.business.uiuc.edu/Working_Papers/Main.asp

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Teece, David J., 1993. "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 112-113, April.
  2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
  3. Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge Workers as Directors," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-12, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  4. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521348911 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  6. Ingemar Dierickx & Karel Cool, 1989. "Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(12), pages 1504-1511, December.
  7. Luigi Zingales, 2000. "In Search of New Foundations," NBER Working Papers 7706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Mahoney, Joseph & McGahan, Anita & Pitelis, Christos, 2009. "The Interdependence of Private and Public Interests," Papers DYNREG40, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
  9. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
  10. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms," NBER Working Papers 7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Oxley, Joanne E., 1999. "Institutional environment and the mechanisms of governance: the impact of intellectual property protection on the structure of inter-firm alliances," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 283-309, March.
  13. Adam M. Brandenburger & Harborne W. Stuart, 1996. "Value-based Business Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 5-24, 03.
  14. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May.
  15. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2005. "Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 223-242.
  16. Argyres, Nicholas S. & Liebeskind, Julia Porter, 1998. "Privatizing the intellectual commons: Universities and the commercialization of biotechnology," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 427-454, May.
  17. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts And The Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84, February.
  18. Christos N. Pitelis, 2004. "(Corporate) Governance, (Shareholder) Value and (Sustainable) Economic Performance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 210-223, 04.
  19. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2001. "Bringing the Market inside the Firm?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 212-218, May.
  20. Boris Groysberg & Linda-Eling Lee & Ashish Nanda, 2008. "Can They Take It With Them? The Portability of Star Knowledge Workers' Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(7), pages 1213-1230, July.
  21. Ingemar Dierickx & Karel Cool, 1989. "Asset Stock Accumulation and the Sustainability of Competitive Advantage: Reply," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(12), pages 1514-1514, December.
  22. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
  23. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  24. Pitelis, Christos, 2009. "The co-evolution of organizational value capture, value creation and sustainable advantage," MPRA Paper 23937, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:illbus:12-0102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.