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Towards a Stakeholder Theory of Strategic Management

  • Mahoney, Joseph T.

    (University of IL)

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    This paper suggests that due to the changing nature of the firm, viewing shareholders as the sole residual claimants is an increasingly tenuous description of the actual relationships among a corporation's various stakeholders. Examining the corporation from a (team production) property rights perspective of incomplete contracting and implicit contracting provides a foundation for the revitalization of a stakeholder theory of the firm in the strategic management discipline.

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    Paper provided by University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business in its series Working Papers with number 12-0100.

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    Date of creation: May 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ecl:illbus:12-0100
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