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Consistency in Organization

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  • Ekkehart Schlicht

Abstract

Internal organization relies heavily on psychological consistency requirements. This perspective has been emphasized in modern compensation theory, but has not been extended to organization theory. The idea is developed by starting from Williamson's discussion of idiosyncratic exchange. The perspective sheds new light on several topics in the theory of the firm, like the boundaries of the firm (Williamson's puzzle), the importance of fairness concerns within firms, the attenuation of incentives, or the role of routines. It implies a perceptional theory of the firm that is realistic in the sense advocated by COASE [1937].

Suggested Citation

  • Ekkehart Schlicht, 2008. "Consistency in Organization," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(4), pages 612-623, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200812)164:4_612:cio_2.0.tx_2-
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    Cited by:

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    6. Zamagni, Stefano, 2005. "Per una teoria economico-civile dell'impresa cooperativa," AICCON Working Papers 10-2005, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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