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Qu'est-ce qu'une firme (-réseau) ?

  • Virgile Chassagnon

    ()

    (LEFI - Laboratoire d'Economie de la Firme et des Institutions - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2)

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    This paper intends to depart from a critique of the nexus of contracts theory of the firmendowed with its moral personification to propose some theoretical foundations of the firm asa real entity. Some old legal views of the corporation are mobilized to complete theconceptual vacuity of economic theories. This provides crucial insights for modern complexorganizations such as the network-firm. The integrating and unifying role of intra-networkpower relationships is then emphasized and some law and economics of the network-firm areultimately proposed to clarify the argument that the network-firm − as the firm stricto sensu −is a singular real entity composed from distinct legal entities.

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    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00374758/document
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    Date of creation: May 2008
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    Publication status: Published in XVIIe Conférence Internationale de Management Stratégique (AIMS), May 2008, France. pp.25, 2008
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00374758
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00374758
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    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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    4. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
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    6. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    8. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," CRSP working papers 487, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    9. Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations," Working papers 441, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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    13. Richard N. Langlois, 2002. "Modularity in Technology and Organization," Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship and the Firm, chapter 2 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84.
    15. Geoffrey Hodgson, 2002. "The Legal Nature of the Firm and the Myth of the Firm-Market Hybrid," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 37-60.
    16. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 2000. "The Essential Role of Organizational Law," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm147, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Nov 2001.
    17. Timothy J. Sturgeon, 2002. "Modular production networks: a new American model of industrial organization," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 451-496, June.
    18. Moore, John, 1992. "The firm as a collection of assets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 493-507, April.
    19. G. Hodgson., 2007. "What Are Institutions?," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 8.
    20. Herbert A. Simon, 2002. "We and they: the human urge to identify with groups," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 607-610, June.
    21. Silvia Sacchetti & Roger Sugden, 2003. "The Governance of Networks and Economic Power: The Nature and Impact of Subcontracting Relationships," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 669-692, December.
    22. Masten, Scott E, 1988. "A Legal Basis for the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 181-98, Spring.
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