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Variation sur le thème 'A la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise'

Listed author(s):
  • Gérard Charreaux

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne)

L'objectif de cet article est de proposer une voie alternative à celle que préconise Zingales pour donner de nouvelles fondations à la finance d'entreprise. En empruntant le même cheminement que Zingales, cet article retient premièrement une définition plus large de la finance, accordant à l'investissement une place au moins équivalente à celle du financement. Deuxièmement, considérant que la vision contractuelle, dans son interprétation traditionnelle fondée sur la protection des actifs spécifiques, conduit à une théorie financière déconnectée de toute considération productive, il propose de lui substituer les théories de la firme associées aux courants cognitifs. Troisièmement, les conséquences de ce passage des théories contractuelles pour réinterpréter les décisions de financement sont analysées. Elles conduisent à apporter des explications nouvelles aux rôles des fonds propres externes et de la dette financière, mais surtout à celui de l'autofinancement, en insistant notamment sur sa dimension positive. Enfin, à l'instar de Zingales, les conséquences de ce changement de grille théorique pour la gouvernance et l'évaluation font également l'objet d'une rapide investigation.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 011201.

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Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2001
Date of revision: Jul 2002
Publication status: published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie,voL.5,n°3,septembre 2002,p.5-68.
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:011201
Note: article publié dans Finance Contrôle Stratégie,voL.5,n°3,septembre 2002,p.5-68.
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References listed on IDEAS
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