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Évolution institutionnelle, schémas mentaux et gouvernement des entreprises : le cas Krupp - Thyssen

  • Peter Wirtz

    ()

    (Finance Magellan - Équipe de Recherche en Finance - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon III - Centre de recherche Magellan de l'IAE)

Une comparaison rapide des contextes institutionnels de différents pays indique que le gouvernement des entreprises n'est pas indépendant de l'environnement national, dans lequel évolue la firme. En même temps, les systèmes de GE à l'intérieur d'un pays ne sont pas statiques, mais subissent des changements au cours du temps. L'objectif du présent article est de proposer un cadre conceptuel, permettant d'expliquer les mécanismes du processus de changement des contraintes pesant sur l'espace discrétionnaire du dirigeant. L'étude d'un cas concret, à savoir le rapprochement de Krupp et Thyssen en Allemagne, nous sert à illustrer la plausibilité de nos hypothèses théoriques.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00748139.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Publication status: Published, Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 1999, 2, 1, 117
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00748139
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00748139
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  1. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1993. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Economic History 9309003, EconWPA.
  2. Douglass C. North, 1993. "Five Propositions about Institutional Change," Economic History 9309001, EconWPA.
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  4. Williamson, Oliver E, 1988. " Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 567-91, July.
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  6. Erik Berglof, 1997. "Reforming corporate governance: redirecting the European agenda," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 12(24), pages 91-123, 04.
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  8. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, 1997. "Corporate Ownership And Control In The U.K., Germany, And France," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 9(4), pages 30-45.
  9. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
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