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Évolution institutionnelle, schémas mentaux et gouvernement des entreprises : le cas Krupp - Thyssen

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  • Peter Wirtz

    () (Centre de Recherche Magellan - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon III - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon)

Abstract

A system of corporate governance consists of the set of mechanisms which constrain managerial discretion. A rapid comparison of the institutional contexts of different countries indicates that corporate governance depends on the national environment of the firm. At the same time, national governance systems are not static, but change in time. The aim of this article is to propose a conceptual framework for an explanation of the modifications of the constraints imposed on managerial dis cretion. The clinical study of the Thyssen- Krupp merger in Germany is an example of the plausibility of our theoretical hypotheses.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Wirtz, 1999. "Évolution institutionnelle, schémas mentaux et gouvernement des entreprises : le cas Krupp - Thyssen," Post-Print halshs-00748139, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00748139
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00748139
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    10. repec:hrv:faseco:30728041 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-Yves Gomez, 2003. "Jalons pour une histoire des théories du gouvernement des entreprises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(4), pages 183-208, December.
    2. Peter Wirtz, 2002. "Opportunism, Stewardship, and the Dynamics of Conflict in a Theory of Corporate Governance," Working Papers CREGO 1020101, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    3. Christine Pochet, 2001. "Le gouvernement de l'entreprise défaillante: étude de trente plans de continuation," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 4(2), pages 149-181, March.
    4. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
    5. Didier Le Maitre, 2013. "Une Negation De L'Influence Des Theories Manageriales Sur Le Comportement A Partir D'Hirschman Et De Von Mises," Post-Print hal-00991951, HAL.
    6. Gérard Charreaux, 2001. "Quelle théorie pour la gouvernance?De la gouvernance actionnariale à la gouvernance cognitive..," Working Papers CREGO 010401, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Feb 2002.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    politique financière; schémas mentaux; discrétion managériale; gouvernement des entreprises; financial policy; corporate governance; mental patterns; managerial discretion;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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