Évolution institutionnelle, schémas mentaux et gouvernement des entreprises : le cas Krupp - Thyssen
A system of corporate governance consists of the set of mechanisms which constrain managerial discretion. A rapid comparison of the institutional contexts of different countries indicates that corporate governance depends on the national environment of the firm. At the same time, national governance systems are not static, but change in time. The aim of this article is to propose a conceptual framework for an explanation of the modifications of the constraints imposed on managerial dis cretion. The clinical study of the Thyssen- Krupp merger in Germany is an example of the plausibility of our theoretical hypotheses.
|Date of creation:||1999|
|Publication status:||Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Association FCS, 1999, 2 (1), pp.117|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00748139|
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