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Le rôle de l'endettement dans le contrôle du comportement managérial:le cas des firmes dégageant du free cash-flow

  • Evelyne Poincelot

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne)

L'objectif de cet article est de mieux cerner le rôle de l'endettement comme variable de contrôle du comportement managérial, pour les firmes dégageant du free cash-flow. L'endettement est supposé être une variable d'action utilisée par les actionnaires pour s'approprier la valeur. Les tests ont permis d'apprécier si les actionnaires exercent un contrôle sur les décisions managériales, en contraignant le dirigeant dans ses choix de financement.

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File URL: http://leg.u-bourgogne.fr/images/stories/wp/0990301.pdf
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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 0990301.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol.2, n°1, mars 1999, p.75-89
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:0990301
Note: article publié dans Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol.2, n°1, mars 1999, p.75-89
Contact details of provider: Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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  1. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
  2. Castanias, Richard P. & Helfat, Constance E., 1992. "Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 153-184, July.
  3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
  4. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
  5. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
  6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  7. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1991. " The Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 297-355, March.
  8. Perfect, Steven B. & Wiles, Kenneth W., 1994. "Alternative constructions of Tobin's q: An empirical comparison," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 313-341, July.
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