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Free Cash Flow, gouvernance et politique financière des entreprises françaises

Author

Listed:
  • Mehdi Nekhili

    (Université de Reims, Groupe ESC Troyes)

  • Afifa Wali Siala

    (Université de Sfax)

  • Dhikra Chebbi-Nehkili

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

(VF)La limitation du problème du free cash flow dépend de l’efficacité des mécanismes de gouvernance.Sur la base d’un échantillon de 123 entreprises françaises en 2004, nous montrons que c’est la distribution soutenue des dividendes, et non le niveau d’endettement, qui permet de réduire le niveau du free cash flow. Les caractéristiques du conseil d’administration et de la structure de propriété agissent directement sur le niveau du free cash flow, plutôt qu’indirectement à travers la politique de distribution des dividendes.(VA)The limitation of free cash flow problems depends on the efficacy of the prevalent governance mechanisms. Investigating a sample of 123 French firms in 2004, we show that it is the sustained distribution of dividends – rather than leverage – that leads to a reduction of free cash flows. The specific characteristics of corporate boards and ownership structure are also shown to have a direct impact on free cash flow levels, rather than indirectly through dividend policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehdi Nekhili & Afifa Wali Siala & Dhikra Chebbi-Nehkili, 2009. "Free Cash Flow, gouvernance et politique financière des entreprises françaises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:11:y:2009:i:q1:p:5-31.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Patrice Charlier & Céline Duboys, 2011. "Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 14(1), pages 5-31., March.
    2. Sami Bacha, 2014. "Does Hedging Financing Ensure Shareholder Value: The Case of Investment Decision," International Journal of Empirical Finance, Research Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 3(5), pages 225-233.
    3. Patrice Charlier & Céline Du Boys, 2011. "Family governance and payout policies to shareholders [Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires]," Post-Print hal-01470330, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Free cash flow; politique d’endettement; politique de distribution de dividende; conseil d'administration; structure de propriété; leverage; dividend policy; performance; ownership structure.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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