IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Family governance and payout policies to shareholders
[Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires]

Listed author(s):
  • Patrice Charlier

    ()

    (Humanis - Humans and Management in Society - Université de Strasbourg)

  • Céline Du Boys

    ()

    (CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille 3 - AMU - Aix Marseille Université)

This paper studies payout policies of listed family firms. The recent evolutions of family firms models bring to study two types of agency conflicts, the one between shareholders and manager (type I), and the one between majority and minority shareholders (type II). Our results show that payout policies are related to the intensity of the two types of agency conflicts which are overall less strong than in non family firms.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01470330/document
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-01470330.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Publication status: Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Association FCS, 2011, 1, pp.1-20
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01470330
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01470330
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01470330. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.