Family governance and payout policies to shareholders
[Gouvernance familiale et politique de distribution aux actionnaires]
This paper studies payout policies of listed family firms. The recent evolutions of family firms models bring to study two types of agency conflicts, the one between shareholders and manager (type I), and the one between majority and minority shareholders (type II). Our results show that payout policies are related to the intensity of the two types of agency conflicts which are overall less strong than in non family firms.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Publication status:||Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Association FCS, 2011, 1, pp.1-20|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01470330|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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