Gouvernance, enracinement et performance des entreprises familiales européennes
The performance of the family firms can be analyzed according to their modes of governance, based on answers to the various assumptions of family entrenchment. The traditional assumption of the « illegitimate » entrenchment is tested by differentiating two modes of governance likely to reduce the negative effects of them : that of the companies controlled by a family with a external leader, and that of the companies directed by a family which no longer is the principal shareholder. The assumption of the « positive » entrenchment or « legitimates » is also tested when the company is controlled and directed by the family. The results of the tests carried out on a sample of European medium-size firms seem to confirm the assumption of a negative family entrenchment.
|Date of creation:||May 2008|
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|Publication status:||Published in LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRÔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE, May 2008, France. pp.CD Rom, 2008|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00522463|
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