IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00455729.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Gouvernance Familiale Et Repartition De La Valeur : Etude Des Politiques De Distribution Aux Actionnaires Des Entreprises Familiales Cotees

Author

Listed:
  • Patrice Charlier

    (CESAG - Centre d'études des sciences appliquées à la gestion)

  • Céline Du Boys

    (CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon)

Abstract

This paper studies payout policies of listed family firms. It analyzes the amount of payout but also the choice between dividends or shares repurchase. The recent evolutions of family firms modelization bring to study two types of agency conflicts, the one between shareholders and manager (type I), and the one between majority and minority shareholders (type II). Our results show that payout policies are related to the intensity of the two types of agency conflicts which are overall less strong than in non family firms. It appears a different repartition of value in family firms, as payout is smaller. In addition, the paper suggests payout policies are used to modify the repartition of power. Family minority shareholder favours share repurchases that enables a concentration of control.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Charlier & Céline Du Boys, 2009. "Gouvernance Familiale Et Repartition De La Valeur : Etude Des Politiques De Distribution Aux Actionnaires Des Entreprises Familiales Cotees," Post-Print halshs-00455729, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00455729
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00455729
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00455729/document
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2202, October.
    2. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    4. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00143974_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    7. Dempsey, Stephen J & Laber, Gene, 1992. "Effects of Agency and Transaction Costs on Dividend Payout Ratios: Further Evidence of the Agency-Transaction Cost Hypothesis," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 15(4), pages 317-321, Winter.
    8. Ginglinger, Edith & Hamon, Jacques, 2009. "Share repurchase regulations: Do firms play by the rules?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 81-96, June.
    9. Correia da Silva, Luis & Goergen, Marc & Renneboog, Luc, 2004. "Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199259304.
    10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    11. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    12. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    13. Gugler, Klaus & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2003. "Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 731-758, August.
    14. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2000. "Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 1-33, February.
    15. Gugler, Klaus, 2003. "Corporate governance, dividend payout policy, and the interrelation between dividends, R&D, and capital investment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1297-1321, July.
    16. Joan Farre-Mensa & Roni Michaely & Martin Schmalz, 2014. "Payout Policy," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 75-134, December.
      • Allen, Franklin & Michaely, Roni, 2003. "Payout policy," Handbook of the Economics of Finance,in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 337-429 Elsevier.
    17. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6655 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    19. Patrice Charlier, 2008. "Gouvernance, enracinement et performance des entreprises familiales européennes," Post-Print halshs-00522463, HAL.
    20. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-659, September.
    21. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1327, June.
    22. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
    23. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    24. Ali, Ashiq & Chen, Tai-Yuan & Radhakrishnan, Suresh, 2007. "Corporate disclosures by family firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 238-286, September.
    25. repec:hrv:faseco:30747163 is not listed on IDEAS
    26. Dominique Poincelot & Alain Schatt, 1999. "Le rachat de leurs propres actions par les sociétés cotées en bourse:bilan d'une pratique nouvelle en France," Working Papers CREGO 0991103, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    27. Jorge Farinha, 2003. "Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(9-10), pages 1173-1209.
    28. Moh'd, Mahmoud A & Perry, Larry G & Rimbey, James N, 1995. "An Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship between Agency Theory and Dividend Policy," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 30(2), pages 367-385, May.
    29. repec:hrv:faseco:30747196 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00455729. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.