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Modern Corporate Changes: Reinstating the Link between the Nature, Boundaries and Governance of the Firm

  • Cécile Cézanne-Sintès

    ()

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR6227 - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis)

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    The theory of the firm and corporate governance are two fields of analysis traditionally tackled separately in the economic literature. This paper seeks to rediscover the link between the nature, boundaries and governance of the firm on the basis of changes in corporate industrial firms. We advance the argument that, to understand the human capital-intensive firm, this analytical interconnection should be restored. On the basis of Critical Resource Theory, we present an innovative vision of the nature, boundaries and governance of firms whose productive activity is built around its key partners' human capital. The organisational mode of governance has changed linked to a renewed conception of the firm. What we term the ‘multi-resources' model of governance of the firm depends on an original representation of the structure, organisation and power relationships of modern firms, whose value arises from the accumulation of specific human capital. Consequently, the multi-resources model involves hybrid governance instrument in order to protect the integrity of the human capital-intensive firm.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00367732.

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    Date of creation: 01 Jul 2008
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    Publication status: Published, International Review of Applied Economics, 2008, 22, 4, 447-461
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00367732
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00367732/en/
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