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Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration

  • Olivier Sautel

    ()

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS)

  • Cécile Cézanne-Sintès

    ()

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS)

Registered author(s):

    The aim of this paper is to reconsider the link between vertical integration and disintegration which are traditionally opposed in the literature. The conception of integration and disintegration closely depends on the way we define the firm and its role. This paper focuses on human capital-intensive firms. We explain that coordination by this kind of firms is much more a coordination of productive tasks than a coordination of property rights. We argue that the role of the firm isn't to manage the hold-up problem using residual rights of control on physical assets, but to coordinate complementarities between internal and external agents, division of labour and specialization of resources. Therefore, we show that the coordinating role of the firm involves a redefinition of the link between integration and disintegration. We advance that it can not be viewed as the opposition between the two institutional modes of coordination which are hierarchy and market. Integration and disintegration must be differentiated through the tools they provide to the firm in order to govern the productive specialization of its human assets.

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    File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00331454/document
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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00331454.

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    Date of creation: 2007
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    Publication status: Published in Economie Appliquée, Presses de l'ISMEA, 2007, 60 (4), pp. 81-106
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00331454
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00331454
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