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Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration

Author

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  • Cécile Cézanne

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Olivier Sautel

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the link between vertical integration and disintegration which are traditionally opposed in the literature. The conception of integration and disintegration closely depends on the way we define the firm and its role. This paper focuses on human capital-intensive firms. We explain that coordination by this kind of firms is much more a coordination of productive tasks than a coordination of property rights. We argue that the role of the firm isn't to manage the hold-up problem using residual rights of control on physical assets, but to coordinate complementarities between internal and external agents, division of labour and specialization of resources. Therefore, we show that the coordinating role of the firm involves a redefinition of the link between integration and disintegration. We advance that it can not be viewed as the opposition between the two institutional modes of coordination which are hierarchy and market. Integration and disintegration must be differentiated through the tools they provide to the firm in order to govern the productive specialization of its human assets.

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Cézanne & Olivier Sautel, 2007. "Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration," Post-Print hal-00331454, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00331454
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