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L'évolution de la théorie des contrats incomplets face à la dé-intégration verticale

  • Olivier Sautel
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    This paper builds upon confrontation of contractual theory of the firm based on Hart et Moore (1990) with recent evidences on vertical disintegration of value chains. We identify a progressive redefinition of nature and role of the firm in these theories. Ownership are no more required for incentives alignment. More than asset?s ownership portfolio, firms become active players in coordination of specialization and task division, wich permit to explain coordination beyond hierarchy, in inter-firms relationships.

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    Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Revue d'économie industrielle.

    Volume (Year): n° 117 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 5-5

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    Handle: RePEc:cai:reidbu:rei_117_0005
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