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The (Non)Theory Of The Knowledge Firm

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  • Paul Walker

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  • Paul Walker, 2010. "The (Non)Theory Of The Knowledge Firm," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-32, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:57:y:2010:i:1:p:1-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    33. Kathleen R. Conner & C. K. Prahalad, 1996. "A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm: Knowledge Versus Opportunism," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 7(5), pages 477-501, October.
    34. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Samuli Leppälä, 2015. "Economic Analysis Of Knowledge: The History Of Thought And The Central Themes," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 263-286, April.
    2. Rehman, Naqeeb Ur, 2016. "Innovation Performance of Chilean SMEs: A Bivariate Probit Analysis," MPRA Paper 68827, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Cécile CEZANNE & Laurence SAGLIETTO, 2014. "Human Capital-Intensive Firms and Symbolic Value Creation," Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business, West University of Timisoara, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 7(1), pages 70-88.

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