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Organizations and Markets

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  • Herbert A. Simon

Abstract

The economies of modern industrialized society can more appropriately be labeled organizational economies than market economies. Thus, even market-driven capitalist economies need a theory of organizations as much as they need a theory of markets. The attempts of the new institutional economics to explain organizational behavior solely in terms of agency, asymmetric information, transaction costs, opportunism, and other concepts drawn from neoclassical economics ignore key organizational mechanisms like authority, identification, and coordination, and hence are seriously incomplete. The theory presented here is simple and coherent, resting on only a few mechanisms that are causally linked. Better yet, it agrees with empirical observations of organizational phenomena. Large organizations, especially governmental ones, are often caricatured as "bureaucracies," but they are often highly effective systems, despite the fact that the profit motive can penetrate these vast structures only by indirect means.

Suggested Citation

  • Herbert A. Simon, 1991. "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 25-44, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:5:y:1991:i:2:p:25-44
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.5.2.25
    as

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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.5.2.25
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General

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