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Das Principal-Agent-Verhältnis zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik als zentrales Problem der Alterssicherung in Deutschland

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  • Fasshauer, Stephan

Abstract

Die Ausführungen behandeln die institutionelle Ausgestaltung der Alterssicherung in Deutschland. Im Mittelpunkt steht das Verhältnis zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik. Die Beziehung wird im Rahmen der Principal-Agent-Theorie - mit der Bevölkerung als Principal und der Politik als Agent - ausführlich beleuchtet. In einem ersten Schritt wird hierbei ein kurzer Überblick über die Principal-Agent-Theorie gegeben und das bestehende Verhältnis zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik in diesen theoretischen Ansatz eingeordnet. Anschließend wird die Beziehung modelltheoretisch bei Sicherheit / Unsicherheit bzw. symmetrischer Informationsverteilung / asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung analysiert. In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt sich, dass die bestehende 'Vertragsbeziehung' zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik im Bereich der Alterssicherung im Vergleich mit alternativen Ausgestaltungsmöglichkeiten zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten führt. Abgeschlossen werden die Ausführungen mit wirtschaftspolitischen Implikationen und Ansätzen für konkrete wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen.

Suggested Citation

  • Fasshauer, Stephan, 2001. "Das Principal-Agent-Verhältnis zwischen Bevölkerung und Politik als zentrales Problem der Alterssicherung in Deutschland," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 31, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wuewep:31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Principal-Agent-Theorie; Alterssicherung; Wohlfahrtseffekte;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues

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