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Forestry and the New Institutional Economics

  • Sen Wang
  • Tim Bogle
  • G. Cornelis van Kooten

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File URL: http://web.uvic.ca/~repa/publications/REPA%20working%20papers/WorkingPaper2012-05.pdf
File Function: Final version, 2012
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Paper provided by University of Victoria, Department of Economics, Resource Economics and Policy Analysis Research Group in its series Working Papers with number 2012-05.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rep:wpaper:2012-05
Contact details of provider: Postal: P.O. Box 1700, STN CSC, Victoria, B.C., V8W 2Y2
Phone: (250) 721-8532
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Web page: http://web.uvic.ca/~repa/

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  45. David L. Haley, 1985. "The Forest Tenure System as a Constraint on Efficient Timber Management: Problems and Solutions," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 11(s1), pages 315-320, July.
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  58. Rucker, Randal R & Leffler, Keith B, 1988. "To Harvest or Not to Harvest? An Analysis of Cutting Behavior on Federal Timber Sales Contracts," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(2), pages 207-13, May.
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