On Choosing Organizational-Arrangements: The Example of Offshore Oil Gathering
The main organizational arrangements found in offshore oil production are described and explained using the transaction cost paradigm. Both measurement cost and rent appropriation economizing are utilized and it is shown that organizational arrangements align with predictions. The internationalization of the industry is shown to depend upon transaction cost economizing motives. Selection of an institutional market arrangement--the invited tender-bid auction--is also shown to be transaction cost dependent. Complexity of product or process is argued to be a separate explanatory variable in the choice of organizational arrangements. Copyright 1991 by Scottish Economic Society.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 38 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0036-9292|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0036-9292|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:38:y:1991:i:3:p:227-41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.