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La durée des contrats interentreprises : une analyse empirique

  • Stéphane Saussier

[eng] The Length of Intercorporate Contracts: An Empirical Analysis by Stéphane Saussier . This paper studies the length of intercorporate contracts based on transaction cost theory. We first describe the trade-off in the choice of contract length and then put forward a set of proposals. We make an econometric test on a complete data base representing the full range of a large French corporation's contractual relations with its suppliers over the 1980-1995 period. Our findings are in line with transaction cost theory. [fre] La durée des contrats interentreprises : une analyse empirique par Stéphane Saussier . Dans cet article, nous étudions la durée des contrats interentreprises en nous plaçant dans le cadre de la théorie des coûts de transaction. Après avoir explicité l'arbitrage à l'œuvre dans le choix de la durée des contrats, nous avançons un ensemble de propositions. Nous effectuons un test économétrique sur une base de données non tronquée représentant l'ensemble des relations contractuelles d' une grande entreprise française avec ses fournisseurs sur la période 1 980- 1 995 . Les résultats confortent la théorie des coûts de transaction.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 135 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 137-146

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_135_4_5930
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5930
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecop

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  1. Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
  2. Masten, Scott E & Meehan, James W, Jr & Snyder, Edward A, 1991. "The Costs of Organization," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
  3. Joskow, Paul L, 1985. "Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 33-80, Spring.
  4. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-85, March.
  5. Mulherin, J Harold, 1986. "Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 105-17, Spring.
  6. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September.
  7. Masten, Scott E & Crocker, Keith J, 1985. "Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1083-93, December.
  8. Joskow, Paul L, 1988. "Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 95-117, Spring.
  9. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, 1988. "Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 327-343, Autumn.
  10. Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1996. "Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-39, January.
  11. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-61, October.
  12. Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 444-63, July.
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