IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Coûts de transaction et contrats incomplets

  • M'Hand Farès
  • Stéphane Saussier

[eng] In this paper, we compare two theories of contract: the transaction cost theory and the incomplete contract theory. Our starting point is to study what is common to the two theoretical frameworks, that is to say the incompleteness of contracting. We show that the source of incompleteness is not the same in the two theories. If they have different foundations, they nevertheless study common questions : vertical integration and interfirms relationships. However, we point out substantial differences in their explanations of such phenomena. [fre] Dans cet article, nous nous proposons de comparer deux théories des contrats : la théorie des coûts de transaction et la théorie des contrats incomplets. Pour cela, nous commençons par étudier ce qui est à la source de l'analogie entre ces deux théories, à savoir l'incomplétude contractuelle. Nous montrons que pour ces deux théories l'origine de l'incomplétude contractuelle est différente. Partant de ce constat, nous montrons que si ces deux théories ont des fondements différents, elles traitent cependant de questions connexes : l'intégration verticale et les relations inter-entreprises. Nous mettons néanmoins en lumière de pro- fondes divergences dans les explications avancées par ces deux axes théoriques.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1518
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_16_3_1518
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 16 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 193-230

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_16_3_1518
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1518
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/rfeco

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
  2. Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 444-63, July.
  3. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September.
  4. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-61, October.
  5. Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1996. "Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-39, January.
  6. Masten, Scott E, 1984. "The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 403-17, October.
  7. Masten, Scott E & Crocker, Keith J, 1985. "Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1083-93, December.
  8. Goldberg, Victor P & Erickson, John R, 1987. "Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 369-98, October.
  9. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-85, March.
  10. Leffler, Keith B & Rucker, Randal R, 1991. "Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1060-87, October.
  11. Georg Nöldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1992. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Paper Serie A 417, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1993.
  12. Kreps, David M, 1996. "Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 561-95.
  13. Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
  14. Paul L. Joskow, 1987. "Price Adjustment in Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal," Working papers 444, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  15. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, 1988. "Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 327-343, Autumn.
  16. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.
  17. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_16_3_1518. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.