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Coûts de transaction et contrats incomplets

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  • M'Hand Farès
  • Stéphane Saussier

Abstract

[eng] In this paper, we compare two theories of contract: the transaction cost theory and the incomplete contract theory. Our starting point is to study what is common to the two theoretical frameworks, that is to say the incompleteness of contracting. We show that the source of incompleteness is not the same in the two theories. If they have different foundations, they nevertheless study common questions : vertical integration and interfirms relationships. However, we point out substantial differences in their explanations of such phenomena. [fre] Dans cet article, nous nous proposons de comparer deux théories des contrats : la théorie des coûts de transaction et la théorie des contrats incomplets. Pour cela, nous commençons par étudier ce qui est à la source de l'analogie entre ces deux théories, à savoir l'incomplétude contractuelle. Nous montrons que pour ces deux théories l'origine de l'incomplétude contractuelle est différente. Partant de ce constat, nous montrons que si ces deux théories ont des fondements différents, elles traitent cependant de questions connexes : l'intégration verticale et les relations inter-entreprises. Nous mettons néanmoins en lumière de pro- fondes divergences dans les explications avancées par ces deux axes théoriques.

Suggested Citation

  • M'Hand Farès & Stéphane Saussier, 2002. "Coûts de transaction et contrats incomplets," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(3), pages 193-230.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_16_3_1518
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1518
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Sautel, 2007. "L'évolution de la théorie des contrats incomplets face à la dé-intégration verticale," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 5-5.
    2. Déprés, Christophe & Grolleau, Gilles & Mzoughi, Naoufel, 2005. "Analyse exploratoire de quelques stratégies de fourniture ‘non publique’ des biens ‘publics’," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 0.
    3. Darine Bakkour, 2013. "L’approche contractuelle du concept de gouvernance," Studies and Syntheses 13-04, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2013.
    4. Veronique Thireau, 2011. "Economie du nucléaire et contentieux," Post-Print hal-01221360, HAL.

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