IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Coûts de transaction et choix contractuels : un test économétrique sur une entreprise publique

  • Stéphane Saussier

[fre] Coûts de transaction et choix contractuels : un test économétrique sur une entreprise publique . par Stéphane Saussier . Ce papier étudie la forme des contrats interfirmes au regard de la théorie des coûts de transaction. Nous soutenons que les choix contractuels des agents s'expliquent par une volonté d'économiser les coûts de transaction. Afin de tester les propositions de la théorie, nous avons construit une base de données de contrats, représentant la totalité des relations contractuelles entre Electricité de France et ses transporteurs de charbon sur la période 1977-1997. Dans un premier temps, nous explorons les facteurs qui peuvent expliquer la forme des contrats dans le cadre de la théorie des coûts de transaction (première partie). Des propositions réfutables sont avancées et testées (deuxième partie) après que les relations contractuelles entre EDF et ses fournisseurs ont été décrites (troisième partie). Les propositions dérivées de la théorie des coûts de transaction sont confirmées par notre étude. [eng] Transactions costs and contractual choice: an econometric test taking a public-sector enterprise . by Stéphane Saussier . This paper examines the form taken by inter-firm contracts in the light of transactions-costs theory. We maintain that agents' contractual choice is explained by a desire to reduce transactions costs. In order to test the conclusions deduced from the theory, we built up a database of contracts representing the totality of the contractual relationships between Electricité de France and its coal transporters over the period 1977-1997. In a first stage, we explore the factors that may explain the form of contracts in the framework of transactions-cost theory (first part). Refutable propositions are put forward and tested (second part), together with a description of the contractual relations between EDF and its suppliers (third part). The conclusions derived from transactions-cost theory are confirmed by our study.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/ecop.2000.6122
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.persee.fr/articleAsPDF/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6122/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6122.pdf?mode=light
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 145 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 169-180

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6122
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6122
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecop

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Kreps, David M, 1996. "Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 561-95.
  2. Crocker, K.J. & Masten, S.E., 1988. "Pretia Ex Machina?: Prices And Process In Long-Term Contracts," Papers 10-88-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  3. Alan Schwartz, 1997. "Incomplete Contracts," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm73, Yale School of Management.
  4. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, March.
  5. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-61, October.
  8. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  9. Al-Najjar, Nabil I, 1995. "Incomplete Contracts and the Governance of Complex Contractual Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 432-36, May.
  10. Eric Brousseau & M'hand Fares, 2000. "Incomplete contracts and governance structures: are incomplete contract theory and new institutional economics substitutes or complements?," Chapters, in: Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 26 Edward Elgar.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6122. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.