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Coûts de transaction et choix contractuels : un test économétrique sur une entreprise publique


  • Stéphane Saussier


[eng] Transactions costs and contractual choice: an econometric test taking a public-sector enterprise . by Stéphane Saussier . This paper examines the form taken by inter-firm contracts in the light of transactions-costs theory. We maintain that agents' contractual choice is explained by a desire to reduce transactions costs. In order to test the conclusions deduced from the theory, we built up a database of contracts representing the totality of the contractual relationships between Electricité de France and its coal transporters over the period 1977-1997. In a first stage, we explore the factors that may explain the form of contracts in the framework of transactions-cost theory (first part). Refutable propositions are put forward and tested (second part), together with a description of the contractual relations between EDF and its suppliers (third part). The conclusions derived from transactions-cost theory are confirmed by our study. [fre] Coûts de transaction et choix contractuels : un test économétrique sur une entreprise publique . par Stéphane Saussier . Ce papier étudie la forme des contrats interfirmes au regard de la théorie des coûts de transaction. Nous soutenons que les choix contractuels des agents s'expliquent par une volonté d'économiser les coûts de transaction. Afin de tester les propositions de la théorie, nous avons construit une base de données de contrats, représentant la totalité des relations contractuelles entre Electricité de France et ses transporteurs de charbon sur la période 1977-1997. Dans un premier temps, nous explorons les facteurs qui peuvent expliquer la forme des contrats dans le cadre de la théorie des coûts de transaction (première partie). Des propositions réfutables sont avancées et testées (deuxième partie) après que les relations contractuelles entre EDF et ses fournisseurs ont été décrites (troisième partie). Les propositions dérivées de la théorie des coûts de transaction sont confirmées par notre étude.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Saussier, 2000. "Coûts de transaction et choix contractuels : un test économétrique sur une entreprise publique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 169-180.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6122
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6122

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    3. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-361, October.
    4. Alan Schwartz, 1997. "Incomplete Contracts," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm73, Yale School of Management.
    5. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    6. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    7. Al-Najjar, Nabil I, 1995. "Incomplete Contracts and the Governance of Complex Contractual Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 432-436, May.
    8. Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1991. "Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 69-99, April.
    9. Eric Brousseau & M’hand Fares, 2000. "Incomplete contracts and governance structures: are incomplete contract theory and new institutional economics substitutes or complements?," Chapters,in: Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 26 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. repec:mes:jeciss:v:30:y:1996:i:4:p:1212-1216 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Kreps, David M, 1996. "Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 561-595.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hakam Kamleh, 2005. "La nouvelle organisation ferroviaire britannique : sur la frontière entre intégration et désintégration," CAE Working Papers 28, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.

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