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Looking for a theory of the firm: future challenges

Listed author(s):
  • Pierre Garrouste

    ()

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Stéphane Saussier

    ()

    (IAE Paris - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Paris - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)

In this paper we present the main developments of the theories of the firm rooted in Coase’s [Coase, R.H., 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica, New Series 4, 386–405] seminal article. We show that the two important topics of the nature and boundaries of the firm, as well as the internal organization of the firm, give place to essential contributions. We present those contributions and their limits and then their possible developments. Finally we introduce the papers of this issue.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-01300351.

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Date of creation: 2005
Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2005, 58 (2), pp.178-199
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01300351
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01300351
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

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