Knowledge, Hierarchy and incentives: Why human resource policy and trust matter
This paper analyses the motivational dimension in the firm within different organizational set-up characterized by their levels of hierarchical pressures and two types of bonus rules Gausian and non Gaussian distribution perceived a more risky by the employees.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, International Journal of Technology and Globalisation, 2007, 3, 1, 8-23|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00453292/en/|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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