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Opportunism is not the only reason why firms exist: why an explanatory emphasis on opportunism may mislead management strategy

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  • Geoffrey M. Hodgson

Abstract

The object of the present essay is neither to overturn transaction cost economics nor to deny the reality of opportunism. Instead, it is to question the explanatory role of the concept of opportunism in the transaction cost analysis of Oliver Williamson and his followers. Williamson has suggested that potential or actual opportunism emerges as the source of the 'transaction costs' involved in monitoring and enforcing contracts. On the contrary, it is shown here that there are several additional and likely sources of contract default or incomplete performance. Williamson's explanatory concentration on opportunism thus misidentifies the reasons for different hierarchical governance structures in the real world. As these additional sources are ignored, the emphasis on opportunism can impair a true understanding of the inner workings of the firm, and be a misleading guide for practical questions of organizational design and corporate strategy. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

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  • Geoffrey M. Hodgson, 2004. "Opportunism is not the only reason why firms exist: why an explanatory emphasis on opportunism may mislead management strategy," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 13(2), pages 401-418, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:13:y:2004:i:2:p:401-418
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    Cited by:

    1. Frolov, Daniil, 2019. "From transaction costs to transaction value: Overcoming the Coase-Williamson paradigm," MPRA Paper 95959, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Alain Verbeke & Liena Kano, 2012. "The Transaction Cost Economics Theory of the Family Firm: Family–Based Human Asset Specificity and the Bifurcation Bias," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 36(6), pages 1183-1205, November.
    3. Christian Cordes & Stephan Müller & Georg Schwesinger & Sarianna M. Lundan, 2022. "Governance structures, cultural distance, and socialization dynamics: further challenges for the modern corporation," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 371-397, April.
    4. Cordes, Christian & Richerson, Peter J. & McElreath, Richard & Strimling, Pontus, 2008. "A naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 125-139, October.
    5. Tomasz Meksula, 2017. "Application of theories of firm to sharing economy platforms based on Uber example (Aplikacja teorii istnienia przedsiebiorstw dla podmiotow ekonomii wspoldzielenia na przykladzie firmy Uber)," Research Reports, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 2(25), pages 38-46.
    6. Alain Verbeke & Liena Kano, 2010. "Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Family Firm," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 34(6), pages 1173-1182, November.
    7. Silvia Sacchetti & Ermanno Tortia, 2016. "A needs theory of governance," Econometica Working Papers wp59, Econometica.
    8. Elsner, Wolfram & Schwardt, Henning, 2015. "The (dis-)embedded firm: Complex structure and dynamics in inter-firm relations. Adding institutionalization as a Veblenian dimension to the Coase-Williamson approach – An emerging triangular organiza," MPRA Paper 67193, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Franck Bailly, 2022. "When mainstream economics does human resource management: a critique of personnel economics’ prescriptive ambition," Post-Print hal-03711945, HAL.
    10. Phanish Puranam & Marlo Raveendran, 2013. "Interdependence and organization design," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), 2010. "The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 4136.
    12. Daniel Leunbach & Truls Erikson & Max Rapp-Ricciardi, 2020. "Muddling through Akerlofian and Knightian uncertainty: The role of sociobehavioral integration, positive affective tone, and polychronicity," Journal of International Entrepreneurship, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 145-164, June.
    13. Alain Verbeke & Liena Kano, 2013. "The transaction cost economics (TCE) theory of trading favors," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 409-431, June.
    14. Andaç T. Arıkan, 2020. "Opportunism is in the Eye of the Beholder: Antecedents of Subjective Opportunism Judgments," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 573-589, January.
    15. Dold, Malte & Krieger, Tim, 2017. "Competition or conflict? Beyond traditional ordo-liberalism," Discussion Paper Series 2017-02, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
    16. Dobrowolski Zbysław & Szejner Tomasz, 2019. "Enhancing Innovation Through Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach to Nurturing the Compliance Culture of the Worldwide Innovation Ecosystem," Journal of Intercultural Management, Sciendo, vol. 11(2), pages 21-46, June.
    17. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, 2010. "Limits of Transaction Cost Analysis," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 28, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2010. "Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 743-752, February.
    19. Nathalie Lazaric & Alain Raybaut, 2007. "Knowledge, Hierarchy and incentives: Why human resource policy and trust matter," Post-Print hal-00453292, HAL.
    20. Hamed Tajedin & Hamed Tajedin & Mohammad Keyhani, 2019. "A Theory of Digital Firm-Designed Markets: Defying Knowledge Constraints with Crowds and Marketplaces," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(4), pages 323-342, December.
    21. Frank Bailly, 2022. "When mainstream economics does human resource management: a critique of personnel economics' prescriptive ambition," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 75(301), pages 103-117.

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