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Interdependence and organization design

In: Handbook of Economic Organization

Author

Listed:
  • Phanish Puranam
  • Marlo Raveendran

Abstract

This comprehensive and groundbreaking Handbook integrates economic and organization theories to help elucidate the design and evolution of economic organization. Economic organization is regarded both as a subject of inquiry and as an emerging disciplinary field in its own right, integrating insights from economics, organization theory, strategy and management, economic sociology and congnitive psychology. The contributors, who share this integrated approach, are distinguished scholars at the productive peak in their fields. Each original, state-of-the art chapter not only addresses foundational issues, but also identifies key issues for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Phanish Puranam & Marlo Raveendran, 2013. "Interdependence and organization design," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14110_11
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849803984.00020.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

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