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Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection

  • Safarzynska, Karolina
  • van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M.

This paper presents a theory of institutional change that builds upon a synthesis of theoretical insights from the literatures on group selection and socio-economic power. Based on a critical reading of relevant studies in sociology, political science and philosophy, we propose a taxonomy of power comprising different sources and mechanisms of exercising power. We discuss how these can be incorporated in a group selection framework to explain the evolution of environmental institutions and policies. This may improve our understanding of the feasibility, effectiveness and dynamics of the latter.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Ecological Economics.

Volume (Year): 69 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (February)
Pages: 743-752

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:743-752
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

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