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Assets, Attributes and Ownership

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  • Kirsten Foss
  • Nicolai Foss

Abstract

The notion of full asset ownership is important in economics, for example, in recent work on the boundaries of the firm. Much of this work has been taken up with the issue why it matters who owns an asset. However, recognizing that assets have multiple attributes, and that these may be subject to capture in a world of positive measurement and enforcement costs, implies that the notion of full asset ownership is problematic. New property rights theorists sidestep these issues by implicitly assuming that residual rights of control are perfectly enforced (i.e. full asset ownership obtains). We discuss the notion of property rights and ownership in a setting characterized by positive costs of enforcement, and suggest that in such a setting, the new property rights model is a part of a more overarching perspective, which also includes older contributions to property rights economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirsten Foss & Nicolai Foss, 2001. "Assets, Attributes and Ownership," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 19-37.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:8:y:2001:i:1:p:19-37
    DOI: 10.1080/13571510151075233
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Foss Kirsten & Foss Nicolai & Klein Peter G. & Klein Sandra K., 2002. "Heterogeneous Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Organization," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-20, March.
    2. Nicolai Foss, 2001. "Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization: Present Use and (Some) Future Possibilities," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 5(3), pages 401-425, September.
    3. Jongeneel, Roelof A. & Polman, Nico B.P. & Slangen, Louis H.G., 2005. "Why Are Farmers Going Multifunctional?," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24585, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    4. Jongeneel, Roelof A. & Polman, Nico B.P. & Slangen, Louis H.G., 2005. "Explaining the Changing Institutional Organisation of Dutch Farms: The Role of Farmer's Attitude, Advisory Network and Structural Factors," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24526, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein, 2005. "The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics A Stocktaking and Assessment," DRUID Working Papers 05-03, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    6. Camille Chaserant, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude. Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01297143, HAL.
    7. Frohwein, Torsten & Burr, Wolfgang, 2011. "Emerging issues in the further development of the resource-based view of the firm," Research Papers on Innovation, Services and Technology 1/2011, University of Stuttgart, Institute of Business Administration, Department I - Institute of Research & Development and Innovation Management.
    8. Foss, Nicolai J. & Klein, Peter G. & Kor, Yasemin Y. & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2006. "Entrepreneurship, Subjectivism, and the Resource-Based View: Towards a New Synthesis," Working Papers 06-0121, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    9. Nicolai Foss, 2002. "'Coase vs Hayek': Economic Organization and the Knowledge Economy," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 9-35.
    10. Chaserant, Camille, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude : Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 83(2), pages 227-253, juin.
    11. Nicolai J. Foss, 2010. "Property Rights Economics," Chapters,in: The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 10 Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ownership; Property Rights; Economic Organization;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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