IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00695532.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Group Selection Perspective on Economic Behavior, Institutions and Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh
  • John M. Gowdy

Abstract

This article examines the role of group dynamics and interactions in explaining economic behavior and the evolution of institutions. Our starting point is the large literature on group selection in the biological, behavioral and social sciences. We present a range of interpretations of group selection, describe a complete set of group selection mechanisms, and discuss the empirical and experimental evidence for group selection. Unique features of cultural group selection are investigated, and opportunities for applying the latter to various areas of economic theory and economic policy are identified.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh & John M. Gowdy, 2009. "A Group Selection Perspective on Economic Behavior, Institutions and Organizations," Post-Print hal-00695532, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00695532
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.017
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00695532
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-00695532/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.017?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
    2. Simon, Herbert A, 1993. "Altruism and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 156-161, May.
    3. Janet Landa, 2008. "The bioeconomics of homogeneous middleman groups as adaptive units: Theory and empirical evidence viewed from a group selection framework," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 259-278, December.
    4. Joëlle Noailly & Jeroen Bergh & Cees Withagen, 2009. "Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 33(2), pages 155-173, March.
    5. Giovanni Dosi & Daniel A. Levinthal & Luigi Marengo, 2003. "Bridging contested terrain: linking incentive-based and learning perspectives on organizational evolution," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 12(2), pages 413-436, April.
    6. Gowdy, John M., 2004. "Altruism, evolution, and welfare economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 69-73, January.
    7. John B. Davis, 2007. "Akerlof and Kranton on identity in economics: inverting the analysis," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 31(3), pages 349-362, May.
    8. Arthur J. Robson, 2002. "Evolution and Human Nature," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 89-106, Spring.
    9. Axelrod, Robert, 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1095-1111, December.
    10. Arthur, W Brian, 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 116-131, March.
    11. Michael Wohlgemuth, 2002. "Evolutionary Approaches to Politics," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 223-246, May.
    12. Henrich, Joseph, 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-35, January.
    13. Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2010. "Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 743-752, February.
    14. Avner Shaked & Ilan Eshel & Emilia Sansone, 1999. "The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(4), pages 447-463.
    15. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2002. "Altruistic punishment in humans," Nature, Nature, vol. 415(6868), pages 137-140, January.
    16. Ilan Eshel & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, "undated". "Altruists Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," ELSE working papers 005, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    17. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-179, March.
    18. Arthur J. Robson, 2001. "The Biological Basis of Economic Behavior," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(1), pages 11-33, March.
    19. Hisashi Ohtsuki & Christoph Hauert & Erez Lieberman & Martin A. Nowak, 2006. "A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks," Nature, Nature, vol. 441(7092), pages 502-505, May.
    20. Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh & John M. Gowdy, 2003. "The microfoundations of macroeconomics: an evolutionary perspective," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 27(1), pages 65-84, January.
    21. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2002. "Evolutionary Approaches to Politics," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 223-246.
    22. George A. Akerlof, 2007. "The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 5-36, March.
    23. Cordes, Christian & Richerson, Peter J. & McElreath, Richard & Strimling, Pontus, 2008. "A naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 125-139, October.
    24. Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, 2005. "Evolution of indirect reciprocity," Nature, Nature, vol. 437(7063), pages 1291-1298, October.
    25. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2002. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 419-436, November.
    26. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 1-33, March.
    27. Joëlle Noailly & Cees Withagen & Jeroen Bergh, 2007. "Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(1), pages 113-141, January.
    28. Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-755, September.
    29. Jason Potts, 2000. "The New Evolutionary Microeconomics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2258.
    30. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    31. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
    32. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    33. Jeroen Bergh & Sigrid Stagl, 2003. "Coevolution of economic behaviour and institutions: towards a theory of institutional change," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 289-317, August.
    34. Alexander Field, 2008. "Why multilevel selection matters," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 203-238, December.
    35. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2003. "The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 211-228.
    36. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers 084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    37. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    38. Crow, James F., 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation, by J. Henrich," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-56, January.
    39. Joan B. Silk & Sarah F. Brosnan & Jennifer Vonk & Joseph Henrich & Daniel J. Povinelli & Amanda S. Richardson & Susan P. Lambeth & Jenny Mascaro & Steven J. Schapiro, 2005. "Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of unrelated group members," Nature, Nature, vol. 437(7063), pages 1357-1359, October.
    40. Samuel Bowles & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2000. "The Co-evolution of Individual Behaviors and Social Institutions," Working Papers 00-12-073, Santa Fe Institute.
    41. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    42. Vatn Arild & Bromley Daniel W., 1994. "Choices without Prices without Apologies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 129-148, March.
    43. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-788, September.
    44. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-1053, July.
    45. Geoffrey M. Hodgson & Thorbjørn Knudsen, 2007. "From Group Selection to Organizational Interactors," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2007-16, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    46. Samuelson, Paul A, 1993. "Altruism as a Problem Involving Group versus Individual Selection in Economics and Biology," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 143-148, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2010. "Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 743-752, February.
    2. Jeroen Bergh, 2007. "Evolutionary thinking in environmental economics," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 521-549, October.
    3. Kemp, R. & van den Bergh, J., 2006. "Economics and Transitions: Lessons from Economic Sub-disciplines," MERIT Working Papers 2006-038, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    4. Waring, Timothy M., 2010. "New evolutionary foundations: Theoretical requirements for a science of sustainability," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 718-730, February.
    5. Safarzyńska, Karolina, 2013. "Evolutionary-economic policies for sustainable consumption," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 187-195.
    6. Jeroen Bergh & Giorgos Kallis, 2013. "A survey of evolutionary policy: normative and positive dimensions," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 281-303, October.
    7. Tavoni, Alessandro & Schluter, Maja & Levin, Simon, 2010. "The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management," Sustainable Development Papers 96843, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    8. Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh & Giorgos Kallis, 2009. "Evolutionary Policy," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-02, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    9. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2013. "Formal and informal quota enforcement," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 191-215.
    10. Bezin, Emeline & Ponthière, Gregory, 2019. "The tragedy of the commons and socialization: Theory and policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    11. Ludo Waltman & Nees Eck & Rommert Dekker & Uzay Kaymak, 2013. "An Evolutionary Model of Price Competition Among Spatially Distributed Firms," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(4), pages 373-391, December.
    12. Joëlle Noailly & Jeroen Bergh & Cees Withagen, 2009. "Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 33(2), pages 155-173, March.
    13. Agnès Festré, 2010. "Incentives And Social Norms: A Motivation‐Based Economic Analysis Of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 511-538, July.
    14. Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Steffen Huck (ed.), Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour, chapter 3, pages 28-54, Palgrave Macmillan.
    15. Geoffrey Hodgson, 2014. "The evolution of morality and the end of economic man," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 83-106, January.
    16. Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, 2010. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization," Post-Print halshs-00754788, HAL.
    17. Yu, Tongkui & Chen, Shu-Heng & Li, Honggang, 2011. "Social Norm, Costly Punishment and the Evolution to Cooperation," MPRA Paper 28814, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Dirk Helbing & Anders Johansson, 2010. "Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 5(10), pages 1-15, October.
    19. Tobias Hahn & Noël Albert, 2017. "Strong Reciprocity in Consumer Boycotts," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 509-524, October.
    20. Isabel Almudi & Julio Sánchez Chóliz, 2011. "Sustainable use of renewable resources: an identity approach," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 97-123, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    B52; D02; D71; Altruism; Altruistic punishment; Assortment; Downward causation; Functionalism; Group formation; Multilevel selection; Other-regarding preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00695532. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.