The Coevolution of Morality and Legal Institutions - An indirect evolutionary approach -
Evolutionary game theory is often used to analyze the evolution of moral preferences. A few studies also examine the coevolution of preferences and an institutional aspect of the decision environment. Allowing the adaptation of just one institutional aspect such as litigation or legal insurance to coevolve with morality, however, may be inadequate. If court rulings coevolve with morality the need for legal insurance may vary over time. Applying the indirect evolutionary approach, we therefore analyze the coevolution of morality in the sense of trustworthiness, court rulings (based on rational belief formation), and the population share which is legally insured. If type detection is not possible, the evolutionary interaction of the legal institutions may play a decisive role for the emergence of morality.
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena|
Phone: +49-3641-68 65
Fax: +49-3641-68 69 90
Web page: http://www.econ.mpg.de/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.econ.mpg.de/english/research/ESI/discuss.php Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Güth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1993.
"Competition or Co-Operation,"
1993-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-07, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Geoffrey Brennan & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2003.
"Trust in the Shadow of the Courts,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 16-, March.
- Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000.
"Evolutionary Norm Enforcement,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
331, CESifo Group Munich.
- Werner Gueth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "Evolutionary Norm Enforcement," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(2), pages 335-, June.
- Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
- Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997.
"Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance,"
CSLE Discussion Paper Series
97-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997. "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 509-520, December.
- Bar-Gill, O. & Fershtman, C., 2001. "The Limit of Public Policy: Endogenous Preferences," Papers 2001-5, Tel Aviv.
- Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard, 2000. "An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 90-116, October.
- Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2002-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karin Richter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.