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The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences

  • Aviad Heifetz
  • Chris Shannon


  • Yossi Spiegel

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.

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Article provided by Springer & Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 32 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 251-286

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:2:p:251-286
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7
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