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Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

  • Oechssler, Jörg
  • Riedel, Frank

The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for the stability of rest points. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies.

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Paper provided by Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes in its series SFB 373 Discussion Papers with number 1998,68.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199868
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  1. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, June.
  2. Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Joerg Oechssler, 1997. "Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect," Game Theory and Information 9702001, EconWPA, revised 15 May 1997.
  3. J. Hofbauer & P. Schuster & K. Sigmund, 2010. "A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 441, David K. Levine.
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