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The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process

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  • Dai, Darong

Abstract

In this paper, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game as a benchmark being used to build a new model as the payoff matrix of an evolutionary game dynamics, with the comparative study of game performances between the behavior- pattern “tit for tat” and the behavior-pattern “always defection”, proving that there exists a strictly positive probability, which has a close link with the discount factor, that a single TFT individual can fully invade into a group of ALLD individuals; that is to say, TFT has some kind of evolutionary stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Dai, Darong, 2010. "The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process," MPRA Paper 40511, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40511
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan Beggs, 2002. "Stochastic evolution with slow learning," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(2), pages 379-405.
    2. JÃrg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 2001. "Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(1), pages 141-162.
    3. Cabrales, Antonio, 2000. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 451-481, May.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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