Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces
The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for stability of rest points. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies.
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- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
- Huck, Steffen & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Oechssler, Jörg, 1997.
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SFB 373 Discussion Papers
1997,38, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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- Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, 2003. "Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse5_2003, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Joerg Oechssler, 1997. "Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect," Game Theory and Information 9702001, EconWPA, revised 15 May 1997.
- J. Hofbauer & P. Schuster & K. Sigmund, 2010. "A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 441, David K. Levine.
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