Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms
Hayek's approach to cultural and institutional evolution has been frequently criticized because it is explicitly based on the controversial notion of (cultural) group selection. In this paper this criticism is rejected on the basis of recent works on biological and cultural evolution. The paper's main contention is that Hayek employed group selection as a tool for the explanation of selection among several equilibria, and not as a vehicle for the emergence of out of equilibrium behavior (i.e. altruism). The paper shows that Hayek's ideas foreshadowed some of the most promising developments in the current literature on the emergence of norms.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Deutschhausstrasse 10, 35032 Marburg|
Web page: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb19/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- José Canals & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998. "Multi-level evolution in population games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(1), pages 21-35.
- Daniel Friedman, 1998.
"On economic applications of evolutionary game theory,"
Journal of Evolutionary Economics,
Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
- Daniel Friedman, 2010. "On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 53, David K. Levine.
- Bhaskar, V. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2004. "Migration and the evolution of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 397-418, November.
- Bhaskar, V & Vega-Redondo, F, 1996. "Migration and the Evolution of Conventions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 354.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Fernando Vega Redondo & Ventakamaran Bhaskar, 1996. "Migration and the evolution of conventions," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, July.
- Dieckmann, Tone, 1999. "The evolution of conventions with mobile players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 93-111, January.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1993. "An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms," Working papers 9323, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Andy Denis, 2002. "Was Hayek a Panglossian Evolutionary Theorist? A Reply to Whitman," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 275-285, September.
- Oechssler, Jorg, 1997. "Decentralization and the coordination problem," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 119-135, January.
- Joerg Oechssler, 1994. "Decentralization and the Coordination Problem," Game Theory and Information 9403004, EconWPA.
- Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-788, September.
- Vanberg, Viktor, 1986. "Spontaneous Market Order and Social Rules," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(01), pages 75-100, April.
- Douglas Whitman, 1998. "Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 45-66, March.
- Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
- De Vlieghere, Martin, 1994. "A Reappraisal of Friedrich A. Hayek's Cultural Evolutionism," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(02), pages 285-304, October.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M., 1991. "Hayek's Theory of Cultural Evolution: An Evaluation in the Light of Vanberg's Critique," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(01), pages 67-82, April.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. & Gale, J., 1993. "Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game," Working papers 9325, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)