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The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek's legacy

Author

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  • Agnès Festré

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Pierre Garrouste

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper is organized as follows : First we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek's thought. Second we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek's theses in this domain. Finally we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek's approach and propose means to solve them.

Suggested Citation

  • Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek's legacy," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00346389, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00346389
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-009-0083-7
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00346389
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    Cited by:

    1. Brette, Olivier & Buhler, Thomas & Lazaric, Nathalie & Marechal, Kevin, 2014. "Reconsidering the nature and effects of habits in urban transportation behavior," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 399-426, September.
    2. Marco, Passarella & Hervé, Baron, 2010. "Concorrenza senza equilibrio. La "scoperta imprenditoriale" nella Teoria Economica Austriaca [Competition without equilibrium. The 'entrepreneurial discovery' in Austrian Economic Theory]," MPRA Paper 28505, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Agnès Festré, 2019. "Michael Polanyi' Vision of Economics: Spanning Hayek and Keynes," GREDEG Working Papers 2019-41, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    4. Agnès Festré, 2015. "Michael Polanyi's Economics: A Strange Rapprochement," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-36, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Oct 2018.
    5. Festré, Agnès, 2021. "Michael Polanyi’s vision of government and economics: Spanning Hayek and Keynes," Journal of Government and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(C).
    6. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2016. "Hayek on Expectations: The Interplay between two Complex Systems," GREDEG Working Papers 2016-13, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    7. Charis Vlados & Dimos Chatzinikolaou, 2019. "Towards a Restructuration of the Conventional SWOT Analysis," Business and Management Studies, Redfame publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 76-84, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hayek; social norms; emergence and evolution; coherence; relevance; normes sociales; émergence et évolution; pertinence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B3 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General

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