The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy
This paper is organized as follows : First we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek's thought. Second we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek's theses in this domain. Finally we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek's approach and propose means to solve them.
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Volume (Year): 22 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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