Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- G. Noldeke & L. Samuelson, 2010.
"An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
538, David K. Levine.
- Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July.
- Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, . "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998.
"Learning in games,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
- Ebbe Groes & Hans JÛrgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1999.
"Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 125-142.
- Ebbe Hendon & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1995. "Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 95-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1991.
"Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games,"
1001, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993.
"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995.
"The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
347, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Hendon, Ebbe & Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen & Sloth, Birgitte, 1996.
"Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 177-202, August.
- Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
- Glenn Ellison, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45.
- Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Game theory and evolutionary biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993 Elsevier.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. & Gale, J., 1993. "Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game," Working papers 9325, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:227-264. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.