The instability of backward induction in evolutionary dynamics
This paper continues the work initiated in . We adopt the same model as in . We show that the non-backward-induction equilibrium component may be evolutionarily stable for any population size in a finite stopping game where the two equilibrium components are terminated by different players. A surprising result is that the backward induction equilibrium component may not be evolutionarily stable for large populations. Finally, we study the evolutionary stability result in a different limiting process where the expected number of mutations per generation is bounded away from both zero and infinity.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem|
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sergiu Hart, 1999.
"Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction,"
Game Theory and Information
9905002, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000.
- R. Cressman & K.H. Schlag, "undated".
"The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction,"
ELSE working papers
027, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993.
"Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
- Kuzmics, Christoph, 2004. "Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 321-336, August.
- N/A, 1996. "Note:," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 31(1-2), pages 1-1, January.
- Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
- Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, September.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Elchanan Ben-Porath, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46.
- Binmore, Ken, 1996. "A Note on Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 135-137, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
"The Theory of Learning in Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
624, David K. Levine.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp633. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tomer Siedner)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.