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Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game

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  • Rapoport, Amnon
  • Stein, William E.
  • Parco, James E.
  • Nicholas, Thomas E.

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  • Rapoport, Amnon & Stein, William E. & Parco, James E. & Nicholas, Thomas E., 2003. "Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-265, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:2:p:239-265
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 115-141.
    2. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 803-836.
    3. Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid, 2001. "Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 104-122.
    4. Aumann, Robert J., 1996. "Reply to Binmore," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 138-146.
    5. Stahl, Dale O., 2000. "Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 105-138.
    6. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 848-881.
    7. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 62-91.
    8. Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
    9. Fey, Mark & McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1996. "An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 269-287.
    10. N/A, 1996. "Note:," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 31(1-2), pages 1-1, January.
    11. Zauner, Klaus G., 1999. "A Payoff Uncertainty Explanation of Results in Experimental Centipede Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 157-185.
    12. Fey, Mark & McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1996. "An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 269-287.
    13. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995. "Consistency and cautious fictitious play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089.
    14. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, pages 9-41.
    15. Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 97-132.
    16. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1-18.
    17. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 92-100.
    18. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, pages 9-41.
    19. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 164-212.
    20. Binmore, Ken, 1996. "A Note on Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 135-137.
    21. Aumann, Robert J., 1998. "On the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 97-105.
    22. Stahl, Dale O., 2000. "Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 105-138.
    23. Binmore, Ken & Swierzbinski, Joe & Proulx, Chris, 2001. "Does Minimax Work? An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 445-464, July.
    24. Dale O. Stahl, 1999. "Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 111-130.
    25. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, January.
    26. Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
    27. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 6-19.
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