IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v17y1996i1p138-146.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reply to Binmore

Author

Listed:
  • Aumann, Robert J.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Aumann, Robert J., 1996. "Reply to Binmore," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 138-146, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:138-146
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(96)90099-8
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
    2. Luo, Xiao, 2009. "The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(12), pages 860-868, December.
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1997. "An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability," Working Papers 1009, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    4. Ken Binmore, 2005. "Why the Distinction Between Knowledge and Belief Might Matter," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 2(1), pages 97-104, April.
    5. Christian Bach & Jérémie Cabessa, 2012. "Common knowledge and limit knowledge," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 423-440, September.
    6. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1998. "Counter-Counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 175-180, July.
    7. Jorn Rothe, 2000. "Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1610, Econometric Society.
    8. Gagen, Michael, 2013. "Isomorphic Strategy Spaces in Game Theory," MPRA Paper 46176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
    10. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    11. Ashton T. Sperry-Taylor, 2017. "Strategy Constrained by Cognitive Limits, and the Rationality of Belief-Revision Policies," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(1), pages 1-13, January.
    12. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
    13. Adam Brandenburger, 2007. "The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 465-492, April.
    14. Farina, Francesco & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2007. "Cooperation as self-interested reciprocity in the Centipede," MPRA Paper 3701, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Kristian Lindgren & Vilhelm Verendel, 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 1-20, January.
    16. Aumann, Robert J., 1998. "On the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 97-105, April.
    17. Rapoport, Amnon & Stein, William E. & Parco, James E. & Nicholas, Thomas E., 2003. "Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-265, May.
    18. Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2016. "The Subgame Perfect Core," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    19. C. McKinney & John Huyck, 2006. "Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(3), pages 297-303, September.
    20. Arieli, Itai & Aumann, Robert J., 2015. "The logic of backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 443-464.
    21. Yun Wang, 2015. "Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games: Theory and Experiment," WISE Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    22. Khan, M. Ali & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2015. "On the centipede game with a social norm," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 16-19.
    23. Pier Luigi Porta & Gianni Viaggi, 2002. "Employment, Technology and Institutions in the Process of Structural Change. A History of Economic Thought Perspective," Working Papers 51, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2002.
    24. Francesco Farina & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2008. "Conditional cooperation in a sequential move game," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 149-165, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:138-146. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.