A Note on Backward Induction
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- Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
- Gagen, Michael, 2013. "Isomorphic Strategy Spaces in Game Theory," MPRA Paper 46176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marco Mantovani, 2015. "Limited backward induction: foresight and behavior in sequential games," Working Papers 289, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2015.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Zibo Xu, 2013. "The instability of backward induction in evolutionary dynamics," Discussion Paper Series dp633, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Sean P. Sullivan, 2016. "Why Wait to Settle? An Experimental Test of the Asymmetric-Information Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 497-525.
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- Yun Wang, 2015. "Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games: Theory and Experiment," WISE Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
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- Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1996. "Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Working Papers 96-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1998. "On the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 97-105, April.
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