Why learning doesn’t add up: equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules
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More about this item
KeywordsAdjustment dynamics; Basins of attraction; Best response dynamics; Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game; Imitate the best dynamics; Learning; Replicator dynamics; C72; C73;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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