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Why learning doesn’t add up: equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules

  • Russell Golman

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-010-0265-3
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

    Volume (Year): 40 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 4 (November)
    Pages: 719-733

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:4:p:719-733
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    1. Golman, Russell & Page, Scott E., 2010. "Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 359-376, March.
    2. Viossat, Yannick, 2008. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 27-43, July.
    3. J. Swinkels, 2010. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 456, David K. Levine.
    4. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
    5. Alos-Ferrer, C., 1998. "Dynamic Systems with a Continuum of Randomly Matched Agents," Papers 9801, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
    6. Alan Kirman, 2006. "Heterogeneity in Economics," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 89-117, May.
    7. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-67, May.
    8. Itzhak Gilboa & Akihiko Matsui, 1990. "A Model of Random Matching," Discussion Papers 887, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Viossat, Yannick & Sorin, Sylvain & Hofbauer, Josef, 2009. "Time average replicator and best reply dynamics," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1014, Paris Dauphine University.
    10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:41:p:1-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    12. Boylan, Richard T., 1990. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Working Papers 748, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    13. Conlisk, John, 1980. "Costly optimizers versus cheap imitators," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September.
    14. Boylan, Richard T., 1992. "Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 473-504, August.
    15. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
    16. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 363-93, April.
    17. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
    18. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
    19. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    20. Michel Benaïm & Josef Hofbauer & Sylvain Sorin, 2003. "Stochastic Approximations and Differential Inclusions," Working Papers hal-00242990, HAL.
    21. J. Hofbauer & P. Schuster & K. Sigmund, 2010. "A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 441, David K. Levine.
    22. Suren Basov, 2004. "Equilibrium selection in coordination games: Why do dominated strategies matter?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(41), pages 1-3.
    23. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Sandholm, William H., 2005. "Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 83-109, October.
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